36. Authority is Not Unitary
Gregory Treat: Okay.
Hello, everybody.
Welcome to episode 36 of
The Great Houses Forum.
I'm Gregory Treat, and we are, talking
as we always talk on The Great Houses
Forum about what it means to have
a great house, what are the, the
intellectual underpinnings, what are
the things, the, the mental frameworks,
the categories that you need to have.
Um, so we've, you know, been talking
about the, uh, the cursus honorum for
the last couple times, and we'll, we'll
probably… We'll, we'll hit on that
a little bit today, but we'll, we'll
return to it full force, uh, next time.
But, um, today I wanted to, to mostly
focus on the idea that, that there
is a difference in how the ancient
world viewed authority and how we
view authority or, or power, right?
one of the major disconnects is that i-
in the modern, the modern day, people
tend to think, "Hey, power is all one
thing." And you can have, you know, so
many units of power can be here, and
so many units of power can be there.
But power is all the same kind of thing.
And, we, we tend to frame these
conversations, uh, these conversations
tend to be framed in terms of
like the individual and the state.
And so you can have so many units
of power with the individual or
so much percentage of power with
the individual, and then a certain
percentage of power with the state.
And I, I wanna say that that is,
that is basically a frame that
we inherit from our enemies.
It is not a good frame.
It is not a frame that, uh, that,
that is held by anybody that likes
us, that wants, uh, our best.
And so, uh, we, we should,
we should think of that.
And, and it's not just Marxists, uh,
though it is the Marxists as well.
Um, th- this idea of power
being one unitary thing, right?
And so we ask, we'll talk about education,
we'll talk about welfare, we'll talk
about inheritance, land, or anything.
We'd usually ask whether the power,
the power should go either to the
individual or the government, right?
And, and broadly, you know, libertarians
will generally choose the individual.
Progressives will generally
choose the government.
And to the extent that we know what
conservative means, um, they're,
they're, they're kind of a mixed
bag in these troubled times, right?
So what I wanna say is is that
authority and power are not one thing.
uh, the, the household, the church,
the state govern different things,
and each one possesses unique
powers to incentivize or create.
There, there are these, this idea
of inherent powers, plural, right?
Plural powers.
Um, and it is this generative
power over a unique domain that is
that institution's power, right?
This, this, the, the… Now, I, I'll
admit these powers are nested, so a
marriage needs money, it needs ethical
guidelines, it needs rights of redress.
And all that, that's fine.
But the marriage has the unique power
to give rise to children, right?
A man and a woman coming together,
they have the power to conceive.
They have the power of fertility.
That is not a power that the state can
handle without there being some kind
of a marriage or some kind of a sexual
union between the state and the, the,
the fertility that, that it wants, right?
This, this, hopefully this
makes sense to everyone.
And, and, you know, there's,
there's the individual.
The individual has power over himself,
especially, you know, in, uh, coming
down to us from the Greeks, the, the
ability to speak, the ability to speak
truth or to apprehend truth, right?
Um, and you can't really, uh, compel that.
You can compel people to
say things or do things.
Uh, but, but you can't compel
people to, to believe things.
You can't compel people to
see things in a certain way.
And, and so that, that, that unique power
to, a- a- another, another frame of this
is you can't compel creativity, right?
Creativity, this, this generative power
of the individual, um, is not really a
thing that you can just say, "Well, well
I'm gonna, I'm gonna force you to do it,"
or there's, there's some amount of money.
I mean, everyone's heard of,
of writer's block, right?
I mean, writer's block is so
interesting because it tends to
happen with the second book, right?
When somebody is already a successful
author, they've already been compensated
to a, a, a very large degree many times,
and so they're trying to figure out, like,
how do I, how do I overcome this block?
And they realize, oh my gosh, the
money is, is not enough, right?
we should think of, and I would say, you
know, parenthetically that our ancestors
did think of it this way, the, the, the,
the government asserting powers to compel
speech would be overriding, which would
be overriding the spirit of a man within
him, or asserting powers to behave like
an economic actor in the market, which is
overriding the duties and responsibilities
of some amount of patriarchs.
Our ancestors would have thought of
that, I believe, as the same category
as, well, the government coming in
and sleeping with your wife so that
you can have your children, right?
What, what, what does that mean, right?
A- and, and the question that I'm
trying to ask and one of the things
that I'm trying to point out is, do
you think that those are your children?
Do you think that that's
your property, right?
'Cause in point of fact, right, if
you're unable to, to make babies with
your wife and your wife gets impregnated
by somebody, there was a human being.
There was, there's somebody's
sperm that was involved, and it's
not yours, it was someone else's.
The, it wasn't the government
in some abstract sense.
There was a person, right?
Uh, that, that, that he had to do
something to create this outcome,
and the kids probably look like him.
A- a- and, and the same thing is
true when, when the government
involves itself in terms of, you
know, helping you get your property.
If the government has to involve
itself to, to, to make property
productive for you, that's weird.
There's something going on
there that we need to, we need
to pay attention to, right?
And, and I'm not anti every
government intervention.
I just want us to appreciate there
are, there are multiple powers
that are being expressed here.
Um, and so the, the, the argument between
the individual and the state, I think
misses, misses a lot because it, it, it…
You can only do that when a- all the
other forms of government, all the
other, the other institutions have been
stripped of their unique powers or,
or those powers have been disregarded
or somehow said, you know, "These,
these, these things don't matter." Um,
a- another metaphor here is that, uh,
incentives have preconditions, right?
If you sit in front of a group of
trees and offer them money to have more
fruit, you are a crazy person, right?
Trees do not, are not able to take
money and buy, you know, on the open
market the things that the trees need.
You, you have to have, um, an agent.
The trees don't need money, they need
light, certain temperature range,
water, critical nutrients, right?
And so you need to offer the money
to someone who is able and willing
to provide those specific things.
Either there has to be a,
a middleman or a proxy.
There has to be somebody that's between
you and the thing that, that, that
you are trying to get to do something.
Now, you know, let us say that you
offer, the person you offered the money
to was legally prohibited from offering
safe neighborhoods, I mean, nitrogen.
Um, if that was just
not on the menu, okay?
Well, i- in that case, the money you
would have to offer them is not just
going to be enough money to purchase
whatever nutrient you wanted to give them.
The money is going to have to be
enough to establish a new market,
or we tend to say the new market.
Parallel economies.
We need to establish parallel economies.
Well, what's a parallel economy?
What do markets require?
They require contracts, they require
standards, they require rights of redress.
They require what the
UN calls an ombudsman.
Ombudsman, very interesting word.
Um, Google that word.
The Office of the Ombudsman, uh, which
is, uh, a very, very powerful, uh, thing
in the- in, in the international scene.
I've called it a guarantor.
The Bible calls it a kinsman redeemer
or the avenger of blood, and many
Christian theology- theologians
call it a magistrate, right?
In, in other words, you have
to pay enough to establish a
parallel governance structure.
Yeah, okay?
And, and this is very interesting.
Um, at the peak of its fertility, England
had at least nine distinct systems of law:
common law, equity, canon law, manorial
custom, uh, borough custom, the law
merchant, the civil, the, the civil law
of the sea, forest law, and stannary law.
And these differ in kind and,
and, and they- there, there
are some ranks between them.
But they, um, they don't, they don't
all resolve into one high Supreme Court.
For most of, of England's history, these
courts just operated independently.
They had their jurisdiction.
It was kind of whichever court you
could get dragged into, in many- in
sometimes cases physically dragged
into, that was the one that was
gonna decide your case, right?
And there, there's this, this ordinance
of the staple in 1353, and they said
merchants at the staple were to be ruled
by the law of merchant and not by the
common law of the land or by the usage of
cities, boroughs, or other towns, right?
So they're, they're establishing
this, well, if you're dealing with
one of these merchants, then you have
to come to their court to sue them.
Uh, which we're, which
we're reinventing today.
I, I didn't have time to fit that
in, uh, in- into this, uh, this
talk, but, uh, we're, we're, we're,
we're getting right back there.
Okay?
Um, a- another, another kind of
curious linguistic thing where this
comes down to is, is somebody…
You ever actually wonder what it
meant to call a man an outlaw?
It meant that a county court had
summoned him, uh, usually five times,
and he had failed to appear, right?
After the fifth time he fails to appear,
he's put outside the king's protection.
He bore what Bracton called
the wolf's head, right?
And like a wolf, uh, any… So in England
for most of its history, you could
kill a wolf with no questions asked.
There was no, there was no prohibition
on killing wolves anywhere in England.
Um, and, and so if you encountered
a man who had the wolf's head, who
was an outlaw, you could kill him,
and he could not appeal to the king's
justice without first, you know,
squaring himself with the king, right?
Now, what's interesting about
this idea of an outlaw is as soon
as you become an outlaw, what's
the first thing that you do?
Well, the first thing that you do is
you, you start generating laws, right?
So Robin Hood goes to the greenwood,
and the first thing his men ask
is whom they are permitted to
rob, and he gives them a rule.
"Leave the husband at, man at his plow,
leave the yeoman and the knight and the
squire, and consider the bishops and the
Sheriff of Nottingham your rightful prey."
Right?
What are Robin Hood's men doing?
They are asking him to define their
jurisdiction, and they're i- in effect
acting as a kind of court of last
resort, , in many, in many cases, um, on
behalf of the peasants or on behalf of
somebody who came and appealed to them.
He's kind of setting himself up, like,
as a, as a, as a quasi king here.
and, and this is important when we,
returning to the, the authority concept
and, and really a lot of this comes down
to, uh, the, the, the great example, the,
the, the thing that I'll ref- return to in
this presentation is the com- convers- uh,
the conversation about fertility, right?
Why do we have such
struggles with fertility?
And I maintain if you want the
household to be able to exert its
unique powers to increase and encourage
fertility, you need a household
that still decides things, right?
The manor court, the parish, the guild,
and the borough all sat because somebody
nearby had cases to hear, right?
And, and in particular, the household
traditionally had real powers to
decide cases between its members.
Uh, when, when the power to
decide purely internal cases
declines, family becomes a luxury.
Children turn into a private
expense at the same time that
leadership, you know, leaders have
to be certified from a distance.
We were talking last week, the last
couple weeks about the, the certification
systems that we have in the modern day.
Um, and, and one of the reasons why
you have to have that is because
when you start denying the smaller
courts, when you deny these smaller
jurisdiction systems, these smaller
governments, then there is no kiddie pool.
There is no, like the only government, the
only court that's operating is ultimately
the, the, the court of the state, right?
The civil government, as
they used to call it, right?
'Cause traditionally the government
was at least three and, and
maybe four or five, right?
The, the fami- the civil government,
which is what we think of as the
state, the church government,
and the family government, right?
But it, but both, all of these
things governed over their
distinct territories, right?
And, and that acted as a way of training.
Like as, as, as bad as, uh, you know,
people I think are very worried, this is,
this is often the case in modern politics.
They're very worried about what the
family or the church or what a strong
family or a strong church could do to you.
So we make the state infinitely powerful
'cause that's gonna fix that, right?
Uh, we make every decision have recourse
to the ultimate lethal power of the
state, the ultimate power of violence.
Um, and, and we don't allow families.
Now, I think that the primary penal
system, the primary way that a
family should be able to enforce its
dictates on a member of the family,
on a member of its household, should
be through economic sanctions, right?
And, and, and that would be a really
interesting thing to allow because
we're going to say, well, I mean,
uh, that, that means you can get
practical access to a court system.
You're having to decide things.
And I think, you know, this is
when we talk about, like, why
is parenting so good for people?
Why is it so good, uh, for
people's maturity to be a parent?
It's 'cause you, you w- turn
into the court of last resort
for your family, right?
Your kids come to you, and they've,
you know, they've had a fight around
the corner, and you didn't exactly
see it, and so you have to ask them.
You have to make inquiries.
I, you know, that, that's good for the
kids to kinda learn how to process, um,
you know, conflict and all these things.
But it's also good for you 'cause it
forces you to think like a judge, okay?
But when you take that away, when
you strip that from a, a family, from
a church, then, you know, fertility
starts to compete with preserving
power i- in a negative feedback
loop that I think we're still, we're
still experiencing today, okay?
Now, i- i- i, you know, going on a-
as I'm, as I'm spending this episode
distinguishing things, I wanna distinguish
between marriage, right, which is the
sexual unit, and the household, which
is the, the economic unit, right?
And, and, and obviously, hopefully
you've, you've, uh, come along with me
on these, these episodes in the past.
This … You've gotten the idea
that the idea of household is
much larger than a, a man, a wife,
and his minor children, right?
The so-called nuclear family.
It can include children, servants,
clients, widows, several marriages,
you know, joined together in one
common integrated firm that is doing
something economically productive and
also raising up the next generation.
It has insourced the, the task of, of, uh,
human capital formation, as they call it,
to u- to use the managerial terms, right?
And, and I'll note that when you, when
you do that, when you have multiple
couples, you have multiple groups of
people collaborating in one venture,
that's what allows for specialization,
which we are told by, you know, all the
corporate people that specialization is
the basis of all efficient production.
If you want to increase the number
of things, you have to allow certain
people to specialize in doing that,
and then allow other people to reap the
benefits of that specialization, okay?
So allow me to give you the,
the metaphor of the tree, right?
So a tree needs water.
It needs water applied over and over on
a regular rhythm long before the fruit
is visible, let alone sellable, right?
A- and, and the man who is watering
that tree is not a market actor.
He can't be a market actor while
he's watering the tree 'cause
there's no immediate market benefit.
So if you leave him exposed to the open
market, the market will tell him, "Don't
water the tree. There's no benefit
there, at least not right now," because
watering is not the most immediately
valuable use of his time or of the water
or of whatever, you know, fertilizer.
Um, the, the tree is going to survive
if it survives and, and, and basically
one of the problems that we're having
is it's not just, you know, the family
and fertility, though the, the, the
family and fertility kind of that's a,
a 20-year timescale to develop that.
This is basically it applies to
a whole bunch of our societies.
There's a whole bunch of R&D stuff
that if, if the, if the R&D doesn't
happen in a two-year timetable, right,
according to the schedule of some,
you know, money manager far, far away
in a boardroom, then it gets cut off.
You know, this is why we've had to
do the venture capital space and the
startup space where people build these
kind of illegible relationships with
venture capitalists, and the venture
capitalist, like the, the, the, the thing
that makes a great venture capitalist
is that he knows when to not intervene.
He knows when to just kinda let the
guy cook and keep dripping money
into his world so he doesn't, you
know, get discouraged and quit.
But he doesn't come in and say, "Okay,
show me how this is immediately productive
or I'm shutting you down," right?
Now- When you're doing that, obviously,
there isn't an immediate financial,
uh, metric that you can use to see if
the w- if work is progressing, which
means you have to make evaluations
based on people's character.
Ooh, character, a scary word, right?
And again, not for us.
We should, we should welcome the
opportunity to say, "Let's, let's think
about character." Um, but so the firm,
went back to our tree, the firm surrounds
the caretaker of the tree with non-market
structures so that he keeps watering
on the rhythm that the tree needs.
He- they, they insulate the caretaker
and therefore it is the firm that is the
market actor, not the caretaker, right?
When you, when you outsource, if
you were to put that guy on 1099 and
he's having to figure out, "Okay, do
I serve, you know, a bunch of these
different people?" Many times he's not
going to keep that sort of schedule.
and that's, you know, the IRS has recent-
released some, some fairly punitive
guidelines on what it, what it means
for somebody to be a 1099 and, uh,
they're, they're, they're going after
an increasing number of people on this
basis of if you're, if you're telling
someone you have to adhere to this
strict schedule, um, which includes just
a whole bunch of, of, of the economy,
well, then you're not really a 1099.
You- you- the, the firm is still
the, the, the economic actor.
And the nuclear family has
the same problem, right?
It cannot survive as an economic
unit unless something, and that
something has traditionally been the
household, stands around it in the
same way that the firm stands around
the tree and the caretaker, right?
Now, I believe, I'm a fairly traditional
Christian, um, that the nuclear family,
a one m- one man, one woman, their minor
children, is the ideal sexual unit.
when I started talking about this like
10 years ago, that was way less of a
controversial statement than it is now.
But you know, here we are.
Um, that structure, I think that's
the ideal structure and, and, and
that is the ideal structure as
a matter of human nature, okay?
Every larger household is built out of
these sexual pairs or, or people that
are not really in a sexual relationship.
Um, but having the husband, wife, and
children be a complete economic unit
requires massive economic preconditions.
It requires employers, schools,
banks, pensions, insurance, and the
state, ever increasingly the state,
to perform functions that the larger
household once performed, okay?
And that all of these other things, you
know, that the churches once performed,
that the clans once performed, right?
And, and, you know, when we think
about the nuclear family, right, in
the Bible and in, in, in the, the,
the ancient languages that the Bible
and most of these texts were written
in, basically in everything written
before 1850, family is just family.
There's no nuclear prefix.
and, you know, these biblical words
always include… They'll, they'll…
Some of, some, some of them are,
they will say, "Yes, we include just
a man and his wife and their minor
children as family," but they always
include the larger unit, right?
you know, there are other words,
clan, that, uh, that, that would say,
well, even a, a man and woman and his
minor children are not sufficient.
They are, they are not what this
word means, and those, many of those
words are actually the dominant,
uh, metaphor for family and the, the
thing that gets translated as family
or house a lot in the, in the Bible.
Uh, you know, I know when I'm, when
I'm talking about things, most houses
were designed to, in the ancient world,
were designed to hold about 50 people.
Um, and then regularly I'll get on,
uh, in fights online with people
that'll say, "Well, you know, in, in
the British, in the Anglo-Germanic, you
know, world, we didn't do this," right?
"We had, we had individual nuclear
families from very, very early on."
And that's true in the sense that the
building in which these families lived
had one man, one woman, and their
minor children, but that building
was surrounded by a bunch of other
buildings , right, that were organized
in basically the same structure as the,
the manor or the multi-generational
manor up on the top of the hill, right?
So it was very different from
moving to a suburb hundreds of miles
away from your nearest relative.
Uh, when that happened, and it did
happen a fair bit, you know, life was
hard i- in the medieval period, it
was, it was viewed as a negative thing.
It was viewed as a, a thing that,
um, that, that meant something had
gone terribly, terribly wrong, right?
And while we're on the subject of nuclear,
nothing, nothing nuclear is stable.
Do you know of anything else that we
call nuclear that implies stability?
Uh, every o- everywhere else in, in
the English language, nuclear means
breakdown and often destruction.
It means you, you stripped away the,
the, the, the rest of the atom, right?
The stable atom, right?
'Cause the atom is the thing
that's the smallest stable unit.
Um, a- and again, the nuclear family can
be, and I, I believe that it is, the,
the ideal sexual unit, but it is fa-
frequently very weak and vulnerable and
therefore suboptimal as an economic unit.
Um, and, and a- and, and, and what happens
when that larger household disappears?
The husband, the wife, the children start
depending on corporations and the state
to perform the work of the household
and, and again, it exposes them to, to
these, um, to these vulnerabilities.
you know, I, I believe that the phrase
nuclear family, it, it, it enters
sociology from, from the German scholars
as an application of Freud's Oedipus
complex, the nuclear complex, which,
you know, if you wanna, want a really
bad time, go ahead and Google that.
and these thinkers, they're, they're all
treating family structure as something
that could be redesigned to reshape human
society kind of will they, know they.
You know, Freud's theory reduced family
relationships to the father, the mother,
the child, and the child's desires
towards the parents and the siblings
and, you know, my children are listening
to this, this podcast, so I'm not
going to describe that in any detail.
Um, but suffice it to say, it was,
it was not pro-civilizational, okay?
Um, and, and so in Freud's
concept, a relationship with a
grandfather or an uncle becomes
a re- an echo of the relationship
with the father or the brother.
So grandparents, uncles, aunts, cousins,
monasteries, and, and guilds, these
fictive family structures then lose any
necessary moral function in society.
Um, i- industrialization, in their
view, had made, uh, the larger
household economically unnecessary
for a time, and th- Freud's theory
thou- taught that s- society that,
uh, that extended relationships
had no moral function either.
Though in the original framing, they,
they kinda downplay this later on, was
the Freudians are kind of reacting to
the first half of the 20th century.
But in Freud's original framing, he
defines, you know, the process of becoming
an adult as tr- as transferring, not, not,
you know, growing out of, but transferring
your attachment to your father to
the, the head of the state, right?
Or the Führer as we might,
uh, we might call him.
Hmm, interesting so I think
a, a better, um, a better
scholar, um, is, Mary Eberstadt.
So we've been talking about the
household as an economic unit.
Um, and, and but it's also the
core of, of our religious units.
You know, one of the, one of the things
that, that we often hear in this space
is, well, religion has declined and
religion is what causes large families.
And so as religion declined,
then family size declined.
And, and Mary Eberstadt wrote a book
called How the West Really Lost God,
and, and basically she, she showed
that at, at best it's very, it's
very questionable as to which one
of these things caused the other.
They're definitely correlated.
The, the level of religiosity in
a, in a state and the, the level
of the average fertility in a
state are, are heavily correlated.
But, and when she says, you know, the,
the size of the family, she means the,
the amount of average children per,
per couple, per sexual unit, right?
Mary doesn't really see the household
as that, that larger structure.
That, that's kind of opaque to her, right?
you know, she has this study of,
of, of France and, you know, there
was a huge decline in infertility
that, that, that preceded the French
Revolution and Robespierre and
the terror and all of this stuff.
So family formation breaks down
first in France, and religious
practice weakened afterwards, right?
And I think that's very, it's very
interesting to, to, to think about.
It's very interesting to, to understand
that, that there's, there's, there's
clearly a relationship both ways,
and if you're, if you're destroying
the family, then the family size,
then religion is gonna decline.
I would actually say that I
think what's going on here is
it's that household structure.
Does the household have the legal tools
that it needs, um, to, to survive, right?
Because children are the fruit of
a marriage, but a large family also
requires a household with enough
money, labor, and status to support it.
Um, that same household, if this is
a, if the household is the economic
structure, um, can send other sons
and daughters into politics, into
business, into church, or the military.
If the only s- institutions that we
can see are the individual and the
state, then we'll, you know, we'll,
our answer to falling fertility
will be a government payout, right?
And that answer leaves the
house- household powerless.
And as it turns out, the unique
powers of the family to reward and
support family formation, which then
is what causes fertility, cannot
be replaced with money, right?
And, you know, this is part of
the whole modernism thing, right?
The modern state grew by answering
requests to free individuals from the
authority of their families, their
churches, their local communities.
So a son could leave the farm and
keep his wages, a daughter could use
a diploma to leave the household.
Employers gained workers who no
longer owed labor to their father's
harvest, and reformers moved education
away from the father's curriculum.
Many, many times explicitly so.
John Dewey and some of his associates
are, you know, famous for, for
making statements like this.
If we've gotta, we've gotta have
some things in the curriculum to
kinda break the old Christian,
uh, the old Christian tradition.
This, this, by the way, is the
origin of the trolley problem, right?
The trolley problem comes into
Psych 101 not really as an honest
let's have a, let's have a, a
debate about ethical philosophy.
It, it's put in there to get people to
accept this idea that, well, sometimes God
just puts you in this impossible situation
where there's no right answer, um, and,
and so you, you've kind of gotta, you've
gotta pick between two evils, right?
Um, and as soon as, as soon as you accept
that premise after spending an hour or
a week, you know, thinking about this
world, inhabiting mentally this world
where God is basically evil, uh, then,
then, then people are much more likely
to engage in, uh, sexual bad behavior.
They're much more likely to
compromise their, their moral stances.
I mean, they're at college, right?
So they're … A lot of the, the, the
guidelines are, are taken off of them.
Um, and so that, that question
is in the curriculum to, to
cause that effect, right?
And, and, and you can
read that in John Dewey.
Like they, they said, "This
is what we're doing," okay?
Um, every one of these changes
takes power away from an older
institution, and most of that power
winds up with the state, right?
And, and so and again, people say, "Well,
it's not the state that's doing this. It's
the labor markets, and it's the schools."
Well, what, what is a labor market, right?
a labor market allows a man to sell
a stranger a certain number of hours
and then go home, and the employer
does not take responsibility for
training him, helping him establish
a family, burying him, or giving him
a permanent place in the household.
that type of labor market is a very
odd, very modern, very different thing.
People have always
worked for other people.
The, there was the servants,
the journeyman, the sailor,
the, you know, the slave.
The, these are all ancient things.
What is new is that a man can
sell his labor by the hour without
becoming part of someone's household
or their, or their, uh, their trade.
And, and the modern state is, is, is
creating the conditions and constantly
intervening to maintain that, that system.
It requires constant incredibly
burdensome, uh, intervention and
regulations and, and audits and
all of these things by the modern
state to, to, to create this.
And the same thing is true
of the modern school, right?
The modern school takes children out of
the productive life of the household,
um, for most of their childhood and
gives them a credential that they can
carry into that labor market, right?
Again, schools are ancient.
We had cathedral schools, we had
grammar schools, we had training
in, in, you know, craft schools,
guild halls, and various things.
But most children still learn
by working alongside adults.
The new thing is a school system that
claims almost all of childhood and
then uses that credential to place
the child in society, where that
power to say, you know, the child is
ready is taken away from the parents.
They're not considered qualified to decide
if a child is ready for something, right?
Uh, so the system takes over much
of the work of forming the child and
prepares him to en- enter a national
economy as an individual worker, right?
Um, you know, one of my, one, one of my
favorite thinkers of, uh, of, uh, of the
last century was, uh, R.J. Rushdoony.
Um, and, and he, he spent a bunch of time
thinking about, about these basic ideas.
So he claimed that the family, and not
the state or even the church, is the
body that should carry law, property, and
inheritance from one generation to the
next, and he taught that God gave every
major social power to the family except
the death penalty, which belongs to the
state, um, and then excommunication,
which belongs to the church.
But he is also one of the two
men most responsible, uh, for
the American Christian school
and homeschool movements, right?
Um, and he, he f- uh, testified in, in a
whole bunch of courts as to the outcomes
when parents raise their children.
It, it's amazing how, you know, on
the numbers you can have a very,
very smart teacher, which we don't
actually have very many smart teachers.
I think the average, uh, IQ of a,
uh, of a public school teacher is now
under 110 IQ, um, which is fascinating.
Uh, but, but, you know, R.J. Rushdoony
showed that even when you had a very
qualified public school teacher and
a, on paper, under-qualified parents,
that parents teaching their children
got distinctly better outcomes.
Um, now again, the there's, there's
a phrase by, by a, a teacher that
I, that I, that I follow, you know,
everywhere you go, there, there you are.
Um, so if you have, if you have
mental problems, if you have deep
spiritual issues, you are going to
replicate those in your children,
but then so will the teachers.
And, and, and more and more, you
know, our, our teachers have,
have, uh, many, many issues, um,
as we're, as we're discovering.
So Rushdoony identified five
social powers that once belonged
primarily to the family.
That was, uh, children, property,
uh, that… Children means the,
the education of the children.
Property, inheritance, uh, welfare, um,
and, and, and kind of jobs training.
Control of children and education
determines who forms the next generation.
Control of property inheritance
determines who can capitalize it.
Control of welfare determines
whether a person looks first to
his house or to the state when he
is old, poor, sick, or in trouble.
And a state that takes on those
powers can leave the family standing.
It's, say, there, there's still a family.
There's still something we call family.
There's still something
we call the household.
There's a little box on your tax
return to check head of household.
But that thing is gutted.
It, it, it lacks so many of their,
uh, their traditional powers, right?
and, and children in this system
become an individual expense.
Uh, so eight children in a functioning
household can collectively labor, create
marriage alliances, and serve as heirs
who can be prepared for leadership.
The same eight children in a rented
apartment are a private expense
carried by two wage earners, right?
Uh, those children produce a, a different
economic result when they are born to
a wage earning couple instead of into
a household that can put them to work
and prepare them for leadership and,
and just share the burden of, of, of
raising children in a modern world, right?
Now, people often say, again in
this discussion, that the difference
was that fertility cratered when
children could no longer provide an
economic boost to, uh, to the family,
uh, on, on, on the farm, basically.
And, and I'm really not sure that's true.
I'm, I'm actually pretty, pretty
confident that it's not true.
I believe when you look at it, that in
s- individuals, as far as I'm aware, I've
never seen a system where individuals
are, have ever been directly incentivized
by their, their mass system, by their
society at large, to have children.
Um, in householding cultures like the
Chinese and the Northern Indians, do you
know who it is that asks the kids when
they will get married and have children?
Is, is it the kids?
Are they, are they petitioning the
family for support to get married?
Is that how the stories go?
No.
The, the overwhelming number, both
from our own Western history and from
the present-day cultures that preserve
this structure is, it is the older
generation who want their children to
have children to preserve their bloodline
and continue the family name, right?
There's, there's memes in the Asian,
you know, the Asian culture about
parents and grandparents nagging the
younger generation to settle down.
A couple months ago, there was this,
this video of a, um, a young Chinese
man, m- maybe in his 20s or something,
and he was, you know, o- older than 25.
He goes back to visit his grandmother
in, in a traditional Chinese village,
and all of the, uh, the, the old ladies
of the village, they find out that he,
he's not married, he's not dating, right?
He doesn't really have any
plan for having a child.
And, uh, they, they gather around
his bed early in the morning, and
they start shouting something that's
basically, "Shame, shame," right?
And he wakes up, and he's,
like, totally disoriented.
It was a hilarious video.
Um, that's how that goes, right?
It's not the kids.
It's not the young adults.
It's not the f- the, the
child-bearing age people that are
ever incentivized to have children.
It would always be sort of if, if
they're alone against the market, right?
It's always gonna be better for them to
work harder and have less children, okay?
Now, they might wanna have sex.
They might wanna, you know, get married
or one of these things, but they don't
really want the burden of children.
The way you get children i- is when you
have the, the, the young adults, the,
the, the child-bearing age young men
and women, is when they are part of a
structure that surrounds them that says,
"Hey, we're gonna deescalate for you.
We're gonna de-stress you.
We're gonna stand between you
and the marketplace," right?
"And what you're gonna give us in
exchange for that economic support
is kids and grandkids," right?
That, that, that's the deal.
That has been the deal for a
very, very long time, okay?
And again, when you do that,
you get, you get specialization.
So a multi-generational family
does not need every marriage to
have the same number of children
to perform the same work, right?
One marriage can raise six, eight, 10
children while other members of the
family pursue politics, business, the
law, or the church and have smaller
families or, you know, in the case of,
uh, traditions that, where you're, you
have celibate priests, no children, right?
Um, you know, four marriages averaging
1.7 children produce about seven children.
Okay?
One marriage with eight children
and three marriages, um, w- where
you, you, you still have the same
average, but if one couple maximizes
their fertility, um, then, then that
family, you're gonna have 13 kids, um,
and, and the family still has three
couples available for specialized work.
Now, this only works when the
household supports that, that couple
with the large family and treats
the work of raising those children
as a position of honor, right?
Which means some grandfather, right, is
stepping in and, and, and doing that.
You know, I've, I've known a, a number
of guys in, in, in high finance in
particular, the stockbrokers, guys like
that, um, uh, investment bankers and
hedge fund guys, and many of them, many
of the, the guys that I would consider
to be basically moral, virtuous people,
that they're not, um, you know, kind of
pure sharks, um, they are devoted uncles.
You know, many of them either didn't
get married or married late, and, and
children were just never a priority.
You know, they, they tended, if
they got married, they're gonna
have, like, a kid, maybe two if,
if their wife really wants a child.
Um, but because they're in close
relationship with their siblings,
they kind of invest in their siblings'
kids, um, and, and that's, that's
the productive strategy for them.
That's how they're gonna see their name,
their lineage, their, their genes endure.
And, and they get the benefits
of having children later in life.
You know, they're, they're,
they're devoted uncles, right?
And that means that there are
people around their bed, at,
at, uh, their deathbed, right?
There are people that
are there at the end.
By the way, if anybody hasn't gone
and, and watched Joshua Rashid's
video, All Wealth is Biological, right?
Then as soon as this podcast is
over, you need to drop whatever
you're doing and go watch that.
It is, it is an incredible, incredible
statement of, of, of some of these ideas.
So appreciate you, Joshua.
Um, so again, returning, the, the
state made large families difficult
by stripping the household of the
power, wealth, and the work, which is
the legal rights to, to control that
labor needed to support them, right?
Schools, pensions, inheritance taxes, and
family courts moved children, property,
and inheritance, uh, out of the household,
uh, along with education and welfare.
Families then responded, individual
sexual couples responded rationally
by having fewer children.
It is this, I believe, that created the
lower fertility and equally importantly,
the lower quality of leadership, okay?
Now, one of the important things
I want to note is this is not
the first time this has happened.
Carl Zimmerman, um, was one of
the first sociologists to study
how family structure changes over
the life of a, uh, of a society.
And he talked about there are
three basic, uh, types of family.
So there is the trustee family,
where the s- the family holds most
of society's governing powers.
Um, trustee families tend to have
a, an awareness of themselves.
They have a self-consciousness
or an identity, and they, they
intend to continue on forever.
They share the economic risks
with their members and share
a- likewise in the rewards.
Okay?
Um, then things decline into
the, the domestic family.
The family still governs marriage to some
extent, inheritance, uh, and children.
Um, but its members generally
work for themselves and keep their
own economic gains and losses.
You know, the family starts to become
the place where, you know, if you have to
go there, they have to take you in, but,
but the ideal is to be out and about.
And then finally, the,
the atomistic family.
The household is primarily a place to live
and consume, while the state, the school,
and the market exercise most of the powers
that once belonged to the family Um, and
he, he talks about the, the origin of
his thesis on this i- is in ancient Rome.
So in early Rome, prior even to
the Republican period, property
and legal rights ordinarily
came through a trustee family.
You could say that an individual
couldn't have rights in early Rome
unless he was a member of a trustee
family and had a paterfamilias
that granted him legal identity.
Uh, then early in the Republican
period, you have something that's
called the Twelve Tables, and the Twelve
Tables allowed for domestic families.
That's where Zimmerman gets this, this
concept of domestic families, and that
form became normal for, for most of
the Roman population, where individual
households had a legal identity.
They kind of, the, it was the
corporation as the individual house.
Um, and so whoever lived under the same
roof was, was part of a, of a certain
amount of control and then, and then
usually the head of household, his
personal property was also part of it.
But you didn't have this shared,
the, the household as a, as a,
as a, as a broad corporation.
Now, interestingly, the
elites did not do this, right?
The great Roman families retained
many of the trustee powers throughout
the Republic, but, but again, it was
sort of as they're letting new people
in, they're allowing them to form
not great houses, but lesser houses.
Uh, and, and, and the, the implication
there is if we let them form great houses,
they're gonna be politically relevant.
We don't want them to be
politically relevant, so we're
gonna neuter their ability.
We're gonna, we're gonna sabotage
or handicap their ability to have
political power by saying, "No,
you can't form, uh, great houses."
Or at least, we're gonna, we're gonna
make it very easy for you to form, you
know, domestic houses that'll break up
from generation to generation, okay?
Um, and, and that did, you know, that
even for the trustee families, even
for the gentes maiores, that, that,
that went away over time, right?
To the point where at the beginning of
the Imperial period, Augustus is, is,
is saying, "Oh, we have a problem."
Now, interestingly, what Augustus does
is he moves marriage inheritance and
childbearing further into the public
space, which has the opposite effect
of what he claimed to want, right?
Uh, he, he tried to strengthen marriage,
uh, by weakening the household.
He tried to strengthen the tree by
removing the firm that provided for it.
Now, people just, you know, different
minds can come to different conclusions
about what Augustus understood and
what… But I'm gonna say he's, uh, he,
he was one of the greatest political
minds ever produced by the human race.
He may have been unaware of what his
reforms would do to the families he
made to strengthen, uh, but, but, you
know, he, he was a really sharp guy.
We would, we would expect him to kinda
understand the effects of what he's doing,
especially because, again, they had this
history of we understand that allowing
large families to accumulate property and
kinda have their own spaces results in,
has, has political implications, right?
And regardless of his private intentions,
the reforms failed because they did
not return the family's ancient powers.
Public rewards and punishments transferred
more authority to the state, okay?
Now- It's not like this
is all Caesar's fault.
Roman leaders for centuries at this point
have been, uh, noting that the governing
class is failing to replace itself.
Roman censors and emperors
repeatedly, uh, legislated against
celibacy, against childlessness.
Augustus rewarded fathers, punished
the unmarried, and described
the childless as traitors.
Now, what he's doing there is he's
acting like a paterfamilias to them.
He was the pater patria, the father of
the empire, and he's acting like it.
He is incorporating these
young men into his household.
He's saying, "I'm going to play
for you the role that the trustee
family, you know, was gonna play."
And we- the outcomes that
we see bear that out.
The people that he was in direct
relationship with, the people that
actually looked to him as a kind
of patron tended to have children,
and the system worked really well.
The people that were outside of his
personal network, which was of course,
you know, most of the empire, didn't…
It, it just didn't do anything for them.
Okay?
Um, every marriage in the governing
class had become part of the competition
for wealth and political office.
Marriages formed and
dissolved for alliances.
Families limited the number of
heirs, and adoptions w- could
supply a successor when necessary.
A- and in many cases, they just
weakened a bunch of things.
So Augustus could reward men for having
children, but he could not make the elites
as a whole reward family without giving
back the privileges that his imperial
state was busy stripping away, right?
And of course, uh, legally speaking,
they, they suffered from the great defect
of, of, of our modern civilization,
which is no-fault divorce, right?
The Romans had invented a, a kind of,
of divorce, uh, that was no-fault.
It was not binding.
It could be ended by, by either person.
An elite wife tended to remain formally
part of her, her father and fa- uh,
father's family and the family cult.
Her dowry remained tied to that family.
Um, and, you know, men who were, who
were, like for instance, competing
for the consulship would end a
marriage and form another marriage.
It, it, it's, it's unclear whether
how many of these marriages
were actually consummated.
But guys like Sulla, Pompey, Caesar,
Cato, Octavian, who became Augustus,
all used marriage this way, right?
And what you're seeing here is a
breakdown of the family culture, a
breakdown of the household system.
Okay?
As the great families weakened,
soldiers increasingly looked to
the commander who paid them and
promised to settle them on land.
That gave a successful general thousands
of clients and dependents, far more than
any single family could provide for.
A- and basically, it wa- it, it created
an incentive for, for revolution.
Um, it also gave young men a path
to money, land, and status that ran
directly through the army or through
the political system more broadly,
and no longer depended on their
fathers and the, and their families.
Now, once the family could no
longer support and honor a man who
stopped in a lower office, every
ambitious man had to keep climbing.
Okay?
Provincial plunder concentrated wealth
in a few commanders, while electoral
bribery and extraordinary military
commands corrupted the old cursus honorum.
A young man from the governing class
then had to borrow enormous sums from
people who cared neither about his future
nor about the future of the republic.
And this is where you get
that elite overproduction.
It's not elite overproduction.
It is when there is, there is not
discrete governing bodies, when there
aren't families, when there aren't
households that can, that can create
a, a place where, hey, you're not gonna
ascend to the highest heights, but you
can be safe, you can be stable, you
can have an honorable place, attract a
wife, raise children, uh, and, and, and
have a sense of dignity in doing that.
You don't have to go out and say,
"We've got to completely reframe
society as a whole." That it's, it's
a, it's a single zero-sum game, right?
Between me and the rest of the
world, 'cause that's really
what it comes down to, right?
If… W- when we talk about the
individual and the state, a lot of that
cashes out in people's heads as, you
know, me versus the world, as it were.
Okay?
And that's a really destructive,
negative, you know, head space to be in.
Okay?
So Britain, uh, paced, faced
a, a similar, a similar problem
after the Wars of the Roses.
Uh, so the, the Wars of the Roses reduced
the titled nobility to about 1,300 men.
It was, again, barely enough to hold and
administer the, the company, the country.
Um, and, and the reformation and the
spiritual awakening that followed
created room for families who were
not noble-born to act as gentlemen,
maintain substantial households, extend
credit, and enter the governing class.
And again, as I s- I talked about
this last week, Britain expanded that,
that leadership class and eventually
used it to administer an empire.
And, and it was the, it was
Britain's ability to give rights
to those households, right?
To have all of those courts, that
multiplicity of courts, allow the
families to kinda play the state, the
in- organs of the state off against one
another so that you had guys that were,
that, that, that had a, a lot of real
practical power so that people internally
to a family, you would not, you would
not spread family business outside.
You would find an older relative, and
you would appeal to him as a judge.
A- a- and, and you would both be
willing to live basically with
whatever he decided because even if
your, even if you lost that particular
struggle, you were still provided
for by the family as a whole, okay?
And you see this thing in, in, uh,
that, that specialization thing that
I was talking about earlier, right?
So a high fertility marriage made
economic and political sense while
the household still carried money
and status across generations.
So you tended to have one marriage
at the center of the estate that
produced the children, preserved
the property, maintained the common
position for the whole family, and
the county would honor that father.
He, I mean, he was literally the heir.
Um, his sons were the men
who staffed the county.
Raising the next generation was,
was something that, that was, was
honored by land, by assistance,
status, authority, and a public name.
Um, and then the younger
sons would go out.
They'd become justices of the
peace, clergymen, military officers,
lawyers, bankers, and men who
could be sent across the empire.
These younger sons could pursue
specialized work, and they tended to have
smaller families, but, but their overall
family size, the, the size of their
lineage didn't decrease because these guys
were in intensely demanding jobs, right?
And, and, uh, and, and they also
understood that if something happened to
the main family, uh, to the, to the heir,
then they would be required to come back.
And one of the things that would
come along with that is, hey, you
need to have more children than
was expected of you if you were
over there serving in India, okay?
And the whole family shared the gains,
and so their work extended the family's
credit, uh, alliances, offices, and reach.
And that began, you know, you
can, you can, you can track it.
It's, it's amazing how, you know,
these things kind of lay themselves
out when you ask the right questions.
Um, so in, in 1858, the, um- The,
there were roughly, before 1858,
there were roughly 370 courts and,
and judges in England and Wales that
exercised jurisdiction over wills.
Some of them belonged to the church, there
were royal courts, there were manorial
courts, there were local jurisdictions.
And, and in 1858, or, uh, in 1857 rather,
they, they, they created a centralized
probate system where all of the probate
questions were, were, were brought
under one state-led project, right?
Um, and there would be one court
that decided all of these things.
Then the, the Matrimonial
Causes Act passed the same year.
It took marriage away from the, the
church courts and, and centralized that.
There was gonna be now one court that
handled probate directly answerable to
the Queen, one court that he- held, um,
held the family court jurisdiction, again,
directly answerable to, to the Crown.
And within 50 years of that decision,
the short version, within 50 years
of that decision, uh, Britain was
experiencing the same kind of fertility
decline, the same thinning of the old
bloodlines as the rest of Europe, right?
Um, and again, this is, this is what,
what has been happening since Rome.
Um, modern governments are doing much the
same thing when they pay an individual
couple where the, the, well, the
household has no property, no ability
to control labor, uh, no authority,
and no, no seat of public honor, right?
A payment cannot create…
It ca- it can't do the generative work.
It cannot inspire the generative power
of a marriage or a household or a church
because those are the institutions that,
that, that give a child a place, an
inheritance, and a future inside a family.
Families will have children again
when they hold the power and the
status to treat those children
as the future of the house, okay?
so kind of in conclusion, I just
wanna end with this idea that, that
we, we keep answering fallity ferti-
falling fertility with payments,
parental leave, housing, and childcare.
That- that's help, and
help is good, right?
But help when you're saying, "Go out
into the market and buy this thing,"
um, it, it, it doesn't, it is not
the same as saying, "We're gonna
allow you to establish a, a firm.
We're gonna allow you to own property.
We're gonna give you the legal rights
and privileges you necessarily need
to build the, the, the, the safe
places, the institutions that wrap
around these individual sexual couples.
We're gonna allow somebody that's
not appointed by, by voting, right?
To exercise jurisdiction.
We're gonna allow there to be judges,
private judges, family judges, that,
that, that, you know, just, just
go through all of this stuff." And,
and, and now, u- understandably, um
Governments don't wanna do this, right?
They don't, they don't want to… They,
they, they want to centralize everything
and then dole out from their big, their
big bucket that they've accumulated
and, and they want that to work.
They really, really want that to work.
They want there to be somebody
that they can threaten with
violence or buy off, probably
with money that they just printed.
Um, and that's what's
going to solve the problem.
And there's just a bunch of
problems that won't be solved
by those two things, right?
A- and we have to say, "Okay,
h- how do we solve that?"
Well, you have to work at one remove.
You have to allow someone
to start a business.
You have to allow someone
to start a household.
You have to allow someone to create an
institution that has enough space within
itself to, to do governance, to, to
understand that it's oriented towards
something other than the, the local
short-term maximization of profit, right?
Now, many of these things will turn
out to be enormously profitable, right?
I mean, was it profitable for
Britain to become an empire?
Yes, it was insanely, insanely
profitable, but it took 100 years.
You know, 150 depending on who you ask.
It took 150 years of, of saying,
"No, families have the right and the
responsibility to govern their own."
Okay?
That's what it takes, and
that's what it will take.
So, um, I just wanted to, to, to take
a, a A podcast and lay out those ideas.
I think it's, uh, you know, we'll,
we'll return, as I said, to the,
to the particular discussion of
the cursus honorum next week.
But, but I wanted us to distinguish
between this, this, this normative
idea of, hey, the, there's two seats
of power, the individual and the state.
No, there's, th- this is actually a
much more complicated reality, right?
Um, and, and then also the, the, to
distinguish between when we talk about
the family, there's the sexual unit,
which, which is a very vulnerable
unit, needs a lot of protection,
and the household, which if we would
allow households to form and to have
their ancient privileges, they're
actually remarkably tough institutions.
They survive a- anything, right?
They, they, they, they endure
through incredible, uh, opposition
so long as they're allowed.
They can pay for a lot, right?
They can, they can incentivize
high character behavior in a
way that a, that a government
or a school simply can't, right?
Now, households aren't, aren't
necessarily gonna be the best
at, at, at doing new R&D, right?
They're not gonna be the, they're,
they're, they're not gonna be
necessarily the best at, at
answering complex questions.
But when what you need is, hey,
we actually do know more or less
what the answer to this question
is, we just need someone to kinda
grit their teeth and do it, well,
that's what the household is for.
That is what the household does.
If you give somebody the, the right
to say, "Hey, these are gonna be my
children and my grandchildren, and
they're gonna be able to honor me, and
I'm going to be able to protect them,"
you will have pillars that will stick
around, that will, that will build the
important things, um, a- and that will
create wealth and, and, and a, and a
high quality, a high character nation.
Uh, at least that's the way
it's always been done before.
And every time that we have tried
to solve problems like fertility by
increasing government power, which
is kind of how the government likes
to solve things, um, it doesn't work.
You have to give these places, you
have to give these institutions
the right to decide for themselves.
You have to let them be a society
or a government unto themselves,
and that's when you're gonna get,
you know, the, the, the fertility
outcomes that you want, okay?
Okay, that is the end of, uh, my
prepared remarks, and now we'll,
uh, transition into the Q&A.
